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Consider a setting in which several groups of individuals with common interests (“clubs”) 
compete with each other for recognition by other individuals. Depending on the context, 
recognition may be expressed by these other individuals joining a club, or choosing one club 
to admire. Clubs compete by providing a public good. Some examples for applications of this 
model include: (i) Churches missionarizing to attract new members; (ii) Open-source software 
projects and Wikipedia; (iii) professors of an economics department competing to attract 
graduate students to their respective fields; (iv) artists and researchers aiming for recognition 
of their work by their peers and the public. Competition between clubs increases the public 
good provision level, and a sufficiently strong competition effect may even lead to 
overprovision. 
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One of the fundamental results of public economics is that public goods are underprovided
relative to the social optimum, if the provision decision is not centralized, but rather left
to the voluntary contributions of economic agents. This market failure explains why most
public goods are state provided.
Yet, there are several areas in which the private provision of public goods has been re-
markably successful. Linux and Latex, Firefox and Thunderbird are just some examples of
the success of open-source software projects, where the program code is essentially a public
good provided by volunteers. A related example is the online encyclopedia Wikipedia, in
which thousands of contributors cooperate to provide an information source of remarkably
high quality.1
While these projects are prime examples of the successful private provision of public
goods, existing economic models of the private provision of public goods do not appear
to match these applications very well. In particular, in Bergstrom, Blume, and Varian
(1986), economic agents are motivated to contribute to the public good by the fact that
they also consume it and beneﬁt from a higher provision level. While this incentive is,
of course, insuﬃcient from a social point of view, as it ignores the positive externalities
imposed on other players, it at least provides some motivation for players.2
However, this consideration cannot explain at all why people donate time to Wikipedia:
An individual who can write a lexicon article on a subject does not need that article for
himself and consequently the existence of this public good should not aﬀect his utility at all.
Therefore, something else must motivate Wikipedia contributors. Similarly, contributors
to Latex or Linux open source software projects could choose just to write the extension
packages that are useful to them without making them available as public goods. Posting
packages requires writing considerable documentation (in order that other people can use
the package and possibly modify it later on), so choosing to make one’s own package
a public good involves considerable eﬀort cost while not improving the “quality” of the
package for the purpose of the author’s own consumption.
Similarly, many professors outside North America (or even there, when they are close
to their retirement) have minimal ﬁnancial incentives to publish their research, or none at
all. However, some continue to spend lots of energy for that purpose and are thus private
suppliers of public goods. Again, if these professors were motivated only by the desire to
1For example, a recent study by the science journal Nature of 42 articles in Wikipedia and (the com-
mercial leader) Encyclopedia Britannica found that the number of factual mistakes was essentially the
same for both sources. See Giles (2005).
2There are other models of the incentives for private provision of public goods. These are reviewed in
the next subsection.
1gain knowledge for their own consumption, it is hard to see why they should bother with
any additional work generated by publishing their research.
It appears plausible that the main motivation for the public good contributors in
the examples above (and in many other cases) is that they enjoy that other people use
“their” work or are attracted to the subjects that the original contributors ﬁnd attrac-
tive. Depending on the situation, there may be several ultimate reasons why public good
contributors enjoy attracting other people. For example, one of the main motivation of
open source software contributors is probably the recognition of their work by their peers
and the users of their program. The more skillfully a program extension is written, the
more people will use that extension and the higher is its author’s reputation gain. It is
plausible that an analogous motivation is also important for many researchers.
Perens (2005) suggests that free-riding behavior is not a major problem for open-source
software projects:3 “All Open Source users start out as free-riders. They download and
try the software, and perhaps deploy it, and do not generally consider contributing to that
software’s development until they are already using it and desire an additional feature.
[...] Volunteers derive emotional fulﬁllment from having users for their software, just as
artists derive fulﬁllment from having others appreciate their paintings. For volunteers,
users provide an intangible beneﬁt which the volunteer desires. Thus, those users should
not be considered free-riders.”
In the Wikipedia example, contributors may enjoy other people becoming better in-
formed on a subject that is close to the heart of the contributor. In the ﬁeld of religion,
many church members engage in activities with the objective of attracting new believers to
their creed. Similarly, professors in, say, microeconomics, may enjoy it if a gifted graduate
student chooses to write his thesis in microeconomics, rather than going over to the dark
side and specialize in macro or labor economics. And professors in those other ﬁelds are
said to harbor analogous feelings.
In our model, public good providers are organized in “clubs”.4 There are two types
of individuals, (old) club members and (new) potential members. Clubs provide a public
good for their old members and for those individuals from the set of potential new members
that decide to join a particular club. (When we call the action of the new players “joining”,
we have the religious or graduate student example above in mind; in the research or open
source examples, “joining” should be thought of as a user or reader “paying his respect”
to the author.)
3Bruce Perens is a prominent ﬁgure in the open source movement. He is a former Debian GNU/Linux
Project Leader and co-founder of the Open Source Initiative.
4In some examples above, these clubs may contain only one member each. This is particularly the case
when the ultimate reason for public good provision is the desire to become “famous”. However, in other
applications, several members have joint interests.
2Potential new members are attracted to clubs through the quality of public goods that
the clubs provide, respectively. While an old member may or may not enjoy the public
good by itself, he (also) receives utility when new players choose to join his club. We
analyze the equilibrium in two scenarios: First, when individual club members decide how
much to contribute to the public good; and second, when clubs are centralized and the
contribution decision is made to maximize the utility of old club members. Equilibrium
contributions are higher in the second scenario, and may be higher than socially optimal
in both scenarios. Apart from the standard positive externality that contributors within
one club exert on each other and on new members, there is also a negative externality
between contributors in diﬀerent clubs. The reason for this is that diﬀerent clubs compete
with each other for potential new members.
1.1 Related literature
The existing literature analyzing the private provision of public goods is divided into four
branches. In one branch, pioneered by Bergstrom, Blume, and Varian (1986), individuals
are motivated to contribute because they are consumers of the public good. In contrast,
as explained above, individuals in our model are not (only) motivated to contribute in
their role as consumers of the public good, but (also) because they aim for recognition by
an audience.
Second, individuals may contribute to public goods because they are altruistic. Becker
(1974) analyzes a model in which the “head of household” has the utility of other “house-
hold members” as arguments in his utility function. This framework is most plausible as
a model of intrafamily behavior, while it might be a stretch to apply it to some of the
examples above.5
Andreoni (1989, 1990) develops the third branch in which individuals are motivated to
contribute by “impure altruism”. While they do not necessarily care about the utility level
that other individuals reach, they directly enjoy a “warm glow” when they give. Techni-
cally, the amount that an individual contributes is an argument of his utility function. In
all three types of models covered so far, all players contribute to the same public good and
enjoy it (or are at most indiﬀerent), if other players increase their contribution level. In
this sense, diﬀerent players don’t compete with each other, as they do in our model. As
5A paper related to both the ﬁrst and second approach, and to our paper in that it models compe-
tition between diﬀerent public good providers, is Peters and Siow (2002) who study premarital parental
investments in children’s wealth. In their model, parents care about their own children’s utility. Spousal
wealth is a public good in marriage, and more wealthy children can marry better spouses (spouse quality
also aﬀects utility). Like club members in our model, parents compete through providing a public good,
and, as in our model, this competition with other families increases the equilibrium provision of the public
good.
3a consequence, a player’s optimal contribution level decreases, if the contribution level of
other individuals increases. In contrast, players in our model create positive externalities
for the audience they are trying to attract, but negative externalities on members of other
clubs who compete for the same audience. Also, increased competition in our model (say,
an increase in the number of clubs) may well lead to a a higher provision level by each
club.
A fourth branch, which is probably most closely related to our paper, was pioneered
by Glazer and Konrad (1996). In their model, players care about how wealthy they are
perceived by other individuals, and use observable charity contributions to signal their
wealth. This model therefore, like ours, builds on the notion that individuals contribute
to public goods in order to impress their fellow citizens. However, contributors do not
directly compete with each other in Glazer and Konrad, in the sense that the recognition
that an individual gets who gives at least the equilibrium threshold contribution is not
diminished, if there are also other individuals who contribute to charity. Also, players
contribute to a single public good in Glazer and Konrad, while in our model, individuals
in the same club cooperate through their contributions, while those in diﬀerent clubs
compete with each other.
Glazer and Konrad also show that a tax on contributions (rather than the subsidy
commonly extended by the tax code through the deductibility of charitable donations) is
beneﬁcial in order to reduce signaling.6 This corresponds to our result that, if competition
between clubs is suﬃciently intense, the level of public good supplied may be excessive.
A paper related to the signaling branch is Benabou and Tirole (2006), who analyze
a model in which an agent is motivated to exercise “pro-social behavior” (for example,
public good provision) not only by his direct personal beneﬁt from that action, but also
by the respect his action generates from other people. Speciﬁcally, there is asymmetric
information about the agent’s preference type, and he receives a reputational utility if
other people believe that he is “pro-social” (i.e., intrinsically enjoys providing the public
good) and “not greedy” (i.e., has a low marginal utility of money). Public good provision
is used to signal a favorable type. Our paper shares with Benabou and Tirole (2006) the
feature that an agent is motivated to provide public goods through the respect his actions
generate from fellow citizens. However, while they analyze a one-agent framework (or,
one in which the reputational utility of diﬀerent agents is independent of each other), in
our model, agents compete with each other for the respect of their fellow citizens, which
generates a negative externality between public good providers.
More peripherally, the present paper is also related to the literature on clubs and
6A similar result in a related framework is also derived in Blumkin and Sadka (2006).
4local public goods.7 A literature starting with Buchanan (1965) studies the formation of
clubs in a framework in which players care about the number or identity of other club
members. The main trade-oﬀ concerning club size is that adding members allows more
cost sharing, but reduces the service quality experienced by all users. In the literature on
local public goods, pioneered by Tiebout (1956), individuals “vote with their feet” to self-
select into one of many localities, and public good provision in each locality is determined
by majority voting. Since sorting leads to (relatively) homogenous communities, majority
voting implements (approximately) eﬃcient levels of public good provision. Our paper
shares with this literature the concept of free mobility, at least for potential new members.
2 The model
Each of n diﬀerent clubs has initially M members. Furthermore, there are P potential new
members who can choose which club to join. To attract new members, and possibly for
their own consumption, clubs or club members provide a public good G, which is produced








j is the contribution of the ith member of club j, which costs that member c(ei
j).
We assume that the cost function satisﬁes c0(0) = 0 and c00(x) > 0 for all x.
Each club, and each potential new member, has a location on a circle with unit cir-
cumference. If potential new member k joins club j, he receives a utility of
A + Gj − τ||xk − Xj||, (2)
where xk is the location of individual k, Xj is the location of club j, so that ||xk −Xj|| is
the distance between xk and Xj,8 and τ is a “transportation cost” parameter. Intuitively,
the clubs produce diﬀerentiated goods, and the distance between a club and a potential
new member measures the ex-ante aﬃnity of such a match (disregarding the quality of the
public good provided).9 Each potential new member has an outside utility level of zero
and either joins the club that provides him with the highest positive utility, or remains
outside, if no club provides a positive utility.
7See Scotchmer (2002) for a review of this literature.
8Note that, for example, the shortest distance between points 0.1 and 0.9 on the circle is 0.2 (i.e., the
distance along the way going over point 0).
9For example, consider diﬀerent religious congregations competing with each other for new members.
Each congregation is characterized by a ﬁxed doctrine, which is likely to appeal diﬀerently to diﬀerent
potential new members, and by the level of community activities of the congregation, i.e., the public good
Gj in the language of our model.
5Clubs are spaced equidistantly on the circle, so that X1 = 0, X2 = 1/n, ..., Xn =
(n−1)/n. Each of the P new individuals’ location is independently drawn from a uniform
distribution on the circle. While each individual knows the realization of his own location,
clubs know only the distribution from which they are drawn.10
The parameter A allows us to distinguish cases in which the potential new members
get a signiﬁcant utility from joining some club from situations in which they might not join
any club at all.11 Varying A allows us to distinguish the eﬀect on public good provision
that arises from a preference for attracting new members alone, on the one hand, from
the eﬀect of competition between diﬀerent clubs on the other hand.
Old club members receive utility from the level of the public good provided by their
own club and from the number of new members who join their club, Pj. Speciﬁcally, the
utility of member i of club j is
Ui
j = αGj + (1 − α)Pj − c(ei
j), (3)
where α ∈ [0,1] measures the weight that old members place directly on the public good
supply, while (1−α) is the weight of the objective of attracting new members. (The linear
form is chosen only to simplify notation, and all results would go through with a utility
function u(G,P) that is concave.
Interpretation The model ﬁts best the church and graduate student examples from the
introduction, because potential new members join (at most) one of the existing clubs. In
other applications where public good providers crave for recognition (like the open source
software example, artists, sports teams), audience members are in principle not limited
to using only one OSS program, admiring only one artist, or to be a fan of only one
club. However, empirical observation suggests that most people in the audience choose to
engage in only a very limited number of such activities. Hence, providers compete with
each other in these applications, too, and the general economic eﬀects identiﬁed in the
next section apply to these examples as well.
10The uncertainty over individual locations “smoothes” the model. If individual locations were known,
then a club would have a very strong incentive to provide more of the public good if a potential new member
is (almost) indiﬀerent between the club and one of its competitors, and the same is, of course, true for the
competing club. As a consequence, a model with known individual locations has the disadvantage (apart
from using a less realistic assumption) that no pure strategy equilibrium exists.
11As an example for the ﬁrst case, think of the graduate student example from the introduction, where
students must write a thesis in one of the ﬁelds micro, macro or econometrics and cannot remain “ﬁeldless”
(unless they exit the program altogether). In this case, A is large. As a diﬀerent extreme, think of political
parties; in most countries, only a small minority of eligible voters become party members, while the large
majority remains without party aﬃliation.
63 Equilibrium
We look at two scenarios for how the public good is provided. In the ﬁrst one, each old
member individually decides how much eﬀort to contribute. In the second one, members
in a club behave cooperatively; one can think of a club president who maximizes the utility
of the initial club members, or club members who interact repeatedly and can “punish”
other club members who play non-cooperatively. We compare the equilibrium in both
scenarios with the social optimum.
In what follows, we look for a symmetric equilibrium in which all old members con-
tribute the same amount to their club’s public good. Consequently, in equilibrium, the
amount of public good provided is the same for all clubs.
Decision to join a club. We ﬁrst analyze the decision of a potential new member
located at x ∈ [0,1/n] which club, if any, to join. We consider here the case that all types
of potential new members join clubs in equilibrium.12 The individual is indiﬀerent between





which we can solve for x = 1
2n + G1−G2
2τ . Similarly, one can compute the indiﬀerent
individual located between clubs n and 1. If both neighboring clubs provide a public good















Social optimum. Consider a social planner who maximizes the aggregate sum of util-

















There are n · M old members, and if each of them provides eﬀort e, each club produces
G = Me and attracts, in expectation, P/n new members, so that each old member receives
utility αMe+(1−α)P
n −c(e). In expectation, each of the P new members is a distance 1/4n
away from the club that he joins, so new members on average receive utility A+Me− τ
4n.
12We discuss further below the case that some potential new members might not join.
13Note that the maximization problem pre-supposes that it is optimal that each old member provides the
same eﬀort level, which is an obvious consequence of the convexity of the cost function and the concavity
of each member’s utility function.
7Taking the derivative with respect to e yields the ﬁrst-order condition
nM2α − nMc0(e) + PM = 0, (7)
Since the second derivative is −nMc00(e) < 0, the ﬁrst-order condition is necessary and






de = c0(e)de. (8)
The left-hand side consists of the social beneﬁt of a marginal increase of one old member’s
eﬀort by de: Each of the M club members beneﬁts by αde; furthermore, each of the (on
average) P/n new members beneﬁts by de. This marginal social beneﬁt of eﬀort must be
equal to the marginal cost of eﬀort on the right hand side.
Note that the eﬀect of public good provision on the joining decision of potential new
members does not enter the optimal rule of the social planner. The reason is that any
marginal rearrangement of new members does not change the sum of the utilities of old
members, because the total number of new members for all clubs is ﬁxed.
Public good provision by individual members. Consider now a situation in which
each old club member decides individually how much of the public good to contribute.
This is, for example, a reasonable model of an open source software project where there
is no central authority that could enforce a higher level of contribution from members.


























Taking the derivative with respect to ei
j yields




j) = 0. (10)
Comparing (10) with (8) yields that the equilibrium level of eﬀort is higher than the
socially optimal level if
α(M − 1) +
P
n

















P < 0, (11)
and lower than socially optimal if the inequality is reversed. A decrease of α or τ, or an
increase of n make it more likely that (11) is satisﬁed. A low α means that individuals care
primarily about attracting new members. An increase in the number of competing clubs,
n, or a decrease in τ (making clubs better substitutes for new members) both intensify
competition between clubs. For example, if α = 0, the condition for old members to
8provide too much of the public good boils down to τ < n. Intuitively, overprovision of
public goods is possible, because each old member exerts both a positive externality (on
his fellow club members and on entrants into his club) and a negative externality (on
members of other clubs, by “stealing” new members). Depending on parameters, either
eﬀect can dominate.
If α = 1, (11) cannot hold, so that the model delivers the standard underprovision
result in this case, because each member disregards the eﬀect of his eﬀort on the public
good consumption of both the M − 1 other old members and the P/n new prospective
members.
Centralized provision of public goods. Consider now a situation where the ties
within a club are strong enough to support a cooperative eﬀort allocation in which all
club members choose their eﬀort level so as to maximize the utility of (old) club members.
This may be a reasonable assumption for churches deciding on missionary activity and
possibly for groups in economics departments trying to attract graduate students to their
ﬁeld. In this scenario, the club maximizes
M
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Taking the derivative with respect to e yields
M
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Comparing (13) with (10), it is clear that more of the public good is provided when the
provision decision is made centrally for the club than when members decide individually.








Again, the public good is more likely to be overprovided the higher is n, and the lower
are τ and α (i.e., the more intense and important is competition for new members). In
addition, a higher M makes overprovision more likely, because the positive externality
on fellow club members is now completely internalized while the negative externality on
members of other clubs continues to be ignored.
Note also that, if the club also internalizes the utility of new members, then overpro-
vision of the public good is guaranteed, because all positive externalities are internalized,
while a negative externality exists between diﬀerent clubs. We summarize the main results.
Proposition 1. 1. If individual club members decide on how much public good to sup-
ply, then the equilibrium provision level is higher than socially optimal if inequality
(11) holds, and lower than socially optimal if the reverse inequality holds.
92. If the public good provision decision is centralized within each club, then the equi-
librium provision level is higher than in the case of individual provision, and higher
than socially optimal if inequality (14) holds, and lower than socially optimal if the
reverse inequality holds.
4 Extensions and applications
4.1 Model extensions
Not all potential new members join. So far, we have assumed that all potential
new members will join one of the n available clubs in equilibrium. If τ is very large (or
A is small), then new types whose location is suﬃciently far away from the location of
the nearest club may choose not to join any club. We now analyze how this changes our
results.
Consider a potential new member located at x ∈ [0, 1
2n] who is just indiﬀerent between
joining club 1 and not joining any club: A + G1 − τx = 0. Since all individuals located


































It is immediate from comparing (15) and (16) that the level provided by the clubs is less
than the socially optimal level. Furthermore, when the provision decision is made by
individual club members, the level supplied is even lower than in the case of centralized
provision. Hence we have
Proposition 2. If, in equilibrium, no potential new member type exists that is indiﬀerent
between two clubs, then the equilibrium public good provision level is lower than socially
optimal. This is true even when the provision decision is centrally coordinated by each
club.
The intuitive reason for this result is simple: If clubs eﬀectively do not compete with
each other for new members, then they do not impose negative externalities on each other.
Rather, the only externality present in this situation is the standard one, neglecting the
10positive eﬀect public goods have on potential new members (and other old club members,
if the provision decision is made by individual members). This result therefore shows
that the driving force behind any overprovision result in this paper is not the assumption
that old members have a preference for attracting new members per se, but rather the
combination: Clubs care about new members and compete for them with other clubs.
Direct state provision vs. prizes. Suppose that the equilibrium public good provision
level is below the socially optimal level, and consider a social planner who is interested
only in increasing the equilibrium level of public good provided. Suppose further that
there are two alternative policies that cost the same amount of money, so the question is
simply which one is more successful in raising equilibrium public good supply: In the ﬁrst
scenario, the social planner produces an amount ∆0 of the public good in each club and
then individuals decide how much to contribute additionally. Another way of thinking
about ∆0 is that the social planner supports all providers in a way that shifts their cost
function to c(e − ∆0). For example, the social planner could give all researchers a course
oﬀ their teaching load, which allows them to do more research.14
In the second scenario, the social planner promises to distribute a “prize” of size Π0
to one of the clubs, and the probability that a club is awarded the prize is proportional to
the number of new members. The idea behind the distribution of a prize is that the social
planner uses the decisions of the potential new members to judge the quality of the public
good provision of the diﬀerent clubs. This is particularly useful for providing incentives
when the social planner cannot directly observe the quality of the public goods provided
by the diﬀerent clubs. In that case, it would not be possible for the social planner to pay
the clubs directly for providing more of their respective public goods.
We assume that the provision decision in each club is centralized and, for tractability,
we assume that each club has a quadratic cost function:















e − ¯ e
τ

Π − ke2, (17)
where ∆ is the amount of public good provided directly by the social planner, Π is the
prize money, and the term in square brackets is the probability that the club wins the
prize.
The ﬁrst scenario, direct provision, corresponds to ∆ = ∆0, Π = 0; and the second,







− 2ke = 0. (18)
14Note that it is plausible that, the more clubs there are and therefore, the more diﬀerent public goods
there are, the less ∆0 can be produced in each club for a ﬁxed amount of money; however, for now, we
just take ∆0 as exogenous and will return to this issue below.




[ατ + (1 − α)P + Π]. (19)
Hence, the equilibrium provision level in the ﬁrst scenario where the planner directly
provides ∆ = ∆0, but no prize, is
e1 + ∆0 =
1
2kτ
[ατ + (1 − α)P] + ∆0 (20)




[ατ + (1 − α)P + Π0]. (21)






If ∆0 is larger than the critical value ∆∗
0, then it is optimal for the social planner to provide
the public good directly, and if ∆0 is smaller, then it is optimal to donate the prize.
Intuitively, the critical level of directly supplied public good increases with the size of
the prize that could be promised alternatively, and decreases with k and τ, because both
of these parameters determine how strong the clubs increase their public good supply as
a response to the prize money they could win.
More interestingly (and perhaps surprisingly), the critical level does not depend on
any of the following: The number of clubs n, the number of potential new members P,
and the parameter α of the utility function.
Independence of α means that, whether the club members are intrinsically motivated
by their own public good consumption or by the prospect of attracting new members, does
not matter for whether direct provision or the donation of prizes is more eﬀective for the
social planner to bring about an increase in the public good level.
Note that an increase in n does not reduce the eﬀectiveness of a given prize to motivate
clubs. While a higher n decreases the likelihood of winning for each club, the marginal
eﬀect of eﬀort on that probability stays the same, independent of n. On the other hand, it
appears reasonable to assume that the amount ∆0 of the public goods that can be produced
by the social planner for the same amount of money decreases, when n increases. If so,
then the more diﬀerent clubs there are, the more likely it is that a prize is the better
instrument for increasing public good supply.
4.2 Applications
Competing through infrastructure. In the location decisions of ﬁrms and individu-
als, the “quality of life” in a particular city often plays a very important role. Conversely,
12cities often try actively to inﬂuence these decisions by providing or subsidizing public
goods like sports teams, symphony orchestras or museums, in order to attract businesses
or highly-skilled individuals to their city. For example, when a city considers whether to
build a new sports stadium, an often used argument is that this will attract new busi-
nesses, providing signiﬁcant indirect economic beneﬁts. Note, however, that these beneﬁts
for the city often correspond to losses of a similar size for another city in which those ﬁrms
would locate in the absence of a new stadium.
Following the local public goods literature pioneered by Tiebout (1956), assume that
each city chooses its provision of public goods internalizing the beneﬁts of its current
residents from the public good (so that we are in the centralized provision scenario of the
model). From equation (14), we know that overprovision relative to the social optimum
becomes more likely if the weight (1 − α) attached to attracting new businesses is high.
Note that we can, in principle, draw some conclusions about the size of α from the value
that is attached to attracting new businesses in the cost-beneﬁt analysis of a project.
Overprovision also becomes more likely if the mobility of ﬁrms increases (i.e., a lower
τ). For example, this might be the case if new information technology like the internet
allows ﬁrms to locate farther away from their customers, or if more ﬁrms are “knowledge-
based” (i.e., don’t have to transfer large production facilities if they want to change their
location). In this context, it is interesting to note that there was a large increase in
stadium construction in the 1990es. While this is just a suggestive story, it is at least
consistent with our model.15
If cities compete ﬁercely against each other to attract businesses through their public
good provision, then our model implies that the state or federal government should not
subsidize such projects, but rather tax or discourage them. This is particularly true if a
large portion of the beneﬁt attributed to the project relates to this motivation.
Also note that competing for businesses through public good provision has the potential
of creating worse welfare eﬀects than competing through direct subsidies paid for ﬁrms
choosing their location: Suppose, for simplicity, that α = 0 (i.e., the public good has no
value per se for the cities’ original inhabitants). If ﬁrms are suﬃciently ﬂexible (τ is low),
then the public good is overprovided in our model, which means intuitively that the last
unit of the public good (costing one dollar to the city’s inhabitants) is valued at less than
a dollar by the ﬁrms.
Alternatively, consider what happens if cities compete by oﬀering direct subsidies to
ﬁrms. Eﬀectively, this is a Salop (1979) oligopoly model with negative “production costs”
(as cities place a positive value when ﬁrms locate there), and the equilibrium subsidy paid
is equal to the cities’ valuation of a ﬁrm minus the “transportation cost” to the next city.
15We are grateful to Brad Humphreys for suggesting this example.
13Note that this subsidy is just a transfer from cities to ﬁrms, and hence does not aﬀect
social welfare.
Sports competitions. Consider a setting in which individual athletes (“old members”,
in the language of our model) compete for the appreciation of spectators (“potential new
members”). Spectators are more likely to prefer more successful athletes (though other
factors such as geography, personality etc. will also play a role). Furthermore, it appears
plausible that the overall level of performance has only a minor inﬂuence on the spectators’
utility, at least on the margin: Whether the Olympic gold medalist wins the Marathon
race in 2:35 (as in 1948) or in 2:10 (2000) probably has no signiﬁcant eﬀect on how much
the respective spectators enjoyed the race or on how much they appreciated the winner.
Hence, in sports, the negative externality of athletes on each other is likely to outweigh
the (small, if any) positive eﬀect of a higher performance level on spectators’ utility. Thus,
from a social point of view, “eﬀort” to win should be discouraged or at least not be par-
ticularly encouraged (at the margin). Indeed, certain performance-enhancing substances
are banned as doping in most sports, and the Olympics had a long history of banning
“professional” athletes (who could presumably exert more eﬀort than amateurs).16
Warfare. In warfare, soldiers often voluntarily provide public goods (e.g., ﬁght bravely,
not surrender in spite of enemy superiority) in a way that is inconsistent with the view
that they are motivated by their role as “consumers” of the military outcome of the war;
in wars between large societies, individual lower ranked soldiers are extremely unlikely to
inﬂuence the outcome of the conﬂict even with very brave actions.
Recognition by their countrymen as heroes appears to be a very important stimulus for
soldiers (and probably more important than monetary incentives, at least for a signiﬁcant
fraction of soldiers). Again, there exists a negative externality among soldiers vying for
recognition, but in this ﬁeld, the positive externality for the whole country (through more
successful warfare) is probably much more important. This is true because, diﬀerent from
our model, in warfare not only that fraction of the general population which chooses to
honor a particular hero beneﬁts from his actions, but rather the public goods provided by
all soldiers beneﬁt all citizens of the country.
To induce more courageous ﬁghting, the military often provides medals for those ﬁght-
ers who provide the most successful endeavors for the public good. In terms of our model,
one can interpret the institution of medals as one that lowers τ: A medal makes it pos-
sible for people who are “further away” from the soldier to recognize (and honor) him as
hero. Institutions that lower τ and thereby increase the equilibrium level of public good
16The problem with the latter policy was that it was hard to implement consistently.
14provision (cf. equation (10)) are useful in settings where the public good is underprovided
in equilibrium.
Researchers. One of the principal motivations for researchers is the recognition of their
peers. They care about the dissemination of their ideas and possibly also about their own
reputation. In terms of our model, think of the act of conducting and publishing research
as public good provision by n “clubs” with one member each (or several members, for
coauthored papers). Each of these clubs is endowed with an “idea” that can be developed
into a published paper. The “potential new members” are other researchers who choose
which papers to read.17 The eﬀort that goes into the development and presentation of
the idea increases its value to other researchers, and better developed ideas attract more
readers and more praise. On the other hand, at least the quality of the presentation hardly
provides any direct utility for the researcher, so α can be assumed to be close to zero.
From (11), after substituting α = 0 and rearranging, we ﬁnd that researchers un-
derprovide eﬀort to develop their ideas if τ > n, and they overprovide eﬀort when this
inequality is reversed. Hence, underprovision is more likely the higher is τ, i.e. the less
inclined professional readers are to read articles outside their core area of interest. In
economics, τ appears to be relatively low compared to, say, mathematics or the sciences,
and so economists tend to spend a lot more eﬀort on writing introductions that are ac-
cessible to fellow economists outside their narrow area of specialization than those other
disciplines.
5 Conclusion
This paper proposes a model of public good provision by clubs in which public good
providers are motivated by the hope of gaining the respect of their audience (or making
audience members join their club). We argue that this incentive has the potential of
explaining many of the most important cases in which public goods are privately provided.
Competition for new members (or audience approval) generates an additional, negative
externality between diﬀerent clubs. It is possible that this negative externality outweighs
the standard positive one, in which case the public good supply by private providers can
be higher than socially optimal.
17In this respect, it does not matter that some researchers, as consumers, may choose to read several
papers, as long as the quantity of papers that each researcher reads is ﬁxed.
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